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The Germiston by-election of 1932 was signigicant in itself. At the time it
attracted detailed national coverage. It was marked by an intensity of
campaigning which often errupted in violence, but also ensured a very
high turn out at the poll. Five government ministers and several opposition
spokesmen visited the constituency to speak in support of their respective
candidates. Moreover there was no shortage of candidates. Five parties
stood in the election, and a further four candidates, including one black,
proposed to stand at some time or other during the election period. The
election was influenced by specifically local factors: particularly by a
bitter strike in the clothing industry. " However, the by-election was of
truly national signigicance. Not only did the outcome of the election re-
present a crushing defeat for the Nationalist/Pact Government of the time,
and thus rendered Hertzog more amenable to the idea of coalition. More
than this, the by-election raised more general questions about the whole
relationship between the 'power bloc1 and the 'white working class', and
highlighted very clearly the impact of the Depression on certain sections
of white workers.
These questions have been discussed^by Kaplan in his analysis of the South
African state during this period. * He argues that during both the Pact
and Fusion periods the state remained under the hegemonic control of 'national
capital'. This hegemony was secured initially by an alliance with white
labour. More specifically, the white new petty bourgeoisie (white collar
and supervisory groups) and the white labour aristocracy (skilled, productive
workers) formed an allied class - represented at the party political level
by the Labour - Nationalist Pact - whilst the newly-proletarianised white
1lumpenproletariat (tne 'poor whites') constituted a supporting class to
the hegemonic fraction of capital. Fusion did not represent any change
in the 'form of state1. The only change which occurred in the composition
of the power bloc concerned the role of white labour, which was finally
dropped from the alliance. This was manifested at the party political level
by the dropping of the Creswellites from the Fusion Cabinet. Fusion must
then, it is argued, be understood rather as a change in the 'form of regime1;
that is, a change purely at the party political level, necessitated by a
disjuncture between the political interests of the power bloc, and its
party political representation. The immediate cause of this disjuncture
was Hertzog's refusal to abandon the gold standard, in the face of opposition
from all sections of capital. Coalition was not, then, a response to
general economic crisis. In the first place, the Depression was relatively
mild in South Africa, and its impact uneven. Gold mining, in fact, expanded
during the period. Moreover, by the time of Fusion - in 1934 - the economy
was already coming out of depression. Nor is there any suggestion in the
writing of Kaplan or his associate writers that the struggles of classes
outside the power bloc may have influenced events in the direction of
Fusion. The primary characteristic of the Depression and the period up to
Fusion is, then, seen to be a crisis of party political representation for
the power blo.c.
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transitory activities of the political actors who occupy the front of the
historical stage.
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The degree of alienation amongst the skilled railway workers was demonstrated
by their threat to stand their own candidate in the by-election.
It is significant that on the one occasion that the SAP attempted to hold
an election meeting among white railway labourers, on the Genniston-Elsburg
deviation scheme, it ended in chaos and a free fight was only narrowly
averted by the sounding of the hooter, signifying that it was time to
return to work. The relationship of the white labourers to the govern-
ment is perhaps best expressed in the words of one of the hecklers at the
meeting:
"Put some money and butter in our pockets; they talk better than words."
In fact the whole background to the Elsburg deviation scheme is quite re-
vealing. The scheme had been planned for some years. It was the advent
of the by-election, however, which reminded Government ministers of the
urgency of the project. Mr Malcolm Hill of the Centre Party charged that
some 600 unemployed men were being brought to Germiston to work on the
Elsburg deviation, and would be registered as voters in order to vote for
the Nationalists. fo " This was an exaggeration, but it does seem that support
for the Nationalist Party was a prerequisite for a job on the scheme.
Furthermore, it appears that many railway labourers were unaware that their
individual v<3tes would remain secret, and feared that they would lose
their jobs if they voted against the Government. Similarly, techniques
of intimidation and employment inducements had been used by the Nationalists
during the earlier Colesburg by-election. On that occasion the
Nationalists were victorious. However, the composition of the crucial
railway vote was very different in the two towns. On the eve of the
Germiston elections the Nationalists were still predicting victory:
"They base this confidence on the result at Colesburg, where they claim
that the railway vote was solidly theirs. They admit, however, that there
is a vast difference between the railwaymen of Colesburg and the railwaymen
of Germiston. At Colesburg a large proportion, if not the majority are
labourers. In Germiston the labourers are in a considerable minority, and
the artisans and running staff men have the issue in their hands. The
Nationalists definitely fear a landslide against them among the higher grades
of railwaymen; and in other parties this expectation applies to the whole
railway service". "
It is, then, hardly surprising that Government spokesmen who visited Germiston
stressed the success of the Railway Administration in increasing the ratio of
white labour employed in the service, rather than the severe wage cuts
suffered by the higher grades.
IV There remains one other significant section of white wage earners in Germiston
which has not been considered so far: the miners. It has been argued that
by this time, this group formed part of a new petty bourgeoisie. 'Ot They no
longer performed productive work, but were solely responsible for policing
the black workers under their authority. Along with white artisans, this
group had entered into alliance with national capital in 1922-4. However,
the Pact victory of 1924 did not enable miners to regain their pre-1922
economic position. 7l> "On the other hand, the white miners did, during this
period gain an important concession in the form of statutory protection
for their existing positions in the division of labour." "72. it might be ar-
gued that the position of the white new petty bourgeoisie (miners) had
much in common with that of the white lumpen-proletariat employed as
labourers by the state. Both groups saw themselves threatened by cheaper
black labour. Also, both looked to the state to guarantee their employment. 7 3
Whilst in agreement with much of the foregoing analysis, it does seem
that certain questions remain unanswered. In the first place, Kaplan
employs chronology to show that Fusion - which took place in 1934 -
could not have been a response to the economic crisis, which was by this
time over. But equally true, coalition occured five months after Hertzog
had abandoned the gold standard, whilst Fusion was only finally sealed
some two years after the event. ' If the main problem was the gold
standard, its solution did not necessitate the break-up of the two-party
system. Furthermore, given the weakness of the Nationalist Party, as
demonstrated by the Germiston by-election, would not the interests of the
South African Party, and its main backers - mining capital - have been
better served by hanging on for a year until a general election was called
in the Knowledge that they would be able to take complete control of
government. At the level of the 'form of state1 'national capital' may
have remained dominant, but nevertheless ' mining capital1 would have
been better placed to defend its interests by virtue of its greater re-
presentation at the level of the 'form of regime'. On the evidence and
arguments Kaplan presents, one would be forced back into seeing coalition/
fusion as a magnanimous gesture on the part of Smuts, inspired by patriotism,
and facilitated by Hertzog1s fear of losing an election.
As regards white wage earners, there seems to be some confusion when dealing
with the changing class positions of the class fractions which comprise this
group. Initially, under the Pact, the white labour aristocracy and the
white new petty bourgeoisie were in alliance with national capital, whilst
the white lumpenproletariat constituted a supporting class. However, with
the transition to modern mass production during the 192o's , white skilled
workers came increasingly into conflict with capital. This was reflected in
divisions within S.A. Labour Party, and growing opposition to Creswell,
who is said to represent fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie. Eventually,
in 1928, the SALP split, with Madeley and the Councillites, representing
the skilled workers, withdrawing from the Pact to establish an independent
social democratic movement. It is argued that from 1928 national capital
was in alliance with only a fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie: "A
considerable proportion of the rest of the new petty bourgeoisie and
white working class were however, being dominated by a racist and parliamentary
cretinist ideology, still in the position of a supportative class- though
to the form of state rather than to national capital exclusively".
It is at this point that certain questions must be raised. What characterises
the white labour aristocracy (i.e. skilled workers) at this point in time
is its increasing struggle with capital over the question of deskilling;
and its withdrawal from the alliance with national capital. Yet it is argued
that it remains a 'supportative class ' by virtue of its domination by
'racist and parliamentary cretinist ideology1. This is not a sufficient
argument. Indeed, one might say that such an ideology is characteristic
of the working classes of most advanced capitalist countries. To establish
that the white labour aristocracy was a supporting class, it would be
necessary to satisfy the second characteristic which Poulantzas lays down:
"The particular support of the supporting classes is due to the fear, whether
real or imaginary of the power of the working class".
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This leads to a 'power fetishism1: the belief in the state as guardian
of their interests against those of the power bloc, and against advances
made by the working class. In the South African context it would have to
be argued that the white labour aristocracy looked to the state to guarantee
its position against the encroachment of black labour. I would suggest
that at this stage this was not the case. White skilled workers saw clearly
that it was the employers' introduction of new machinery and mass production
techniques which threatened their position in the labour process. 6.
Furthermore, Poulantzas argues that a supporting class is incapable of
achieving autonomous political organization. The continued existance of
the Labour Party might suggest that this was not the case with the white
labour aristocracy in South Africa. ?•
Kaplan's treatment of the 'white wage earners' during the period of the
Depression and up to Fusion also raises certain questions. He argues that
mechanization continued to undermine the position of skilled white workers:
"The alliance of this fraction of 'white labour' with national capital, al-
ready as we have seen considerably undermined during the Pact period, was
further weakened. They now were in the position of a supportative rather
than an allied class and this was manifested at the party political level
by the dropping of the Creswellite wing of the Labour Party from the
'Fusion Cabinet". 8-
This must surely be incorrect - since it has already been decided that
Creswell represented the new petty bourgeoisie. If the dropping of the
Creswellites signifies anything, it must be the demotion of the new petty
bourgeoisie from the status of a class allied to national capital to that
of a supporting class. This seems more tenable. The new petty bourgeoisie
lost any autonomous party political representation, and it is this class -
the white miners, for instance - which looked increasingly to the state to
guarantee their position within the labour process. Alternatively one
might argue that the expulsion of the Creswellites from the Fusion Cabinet
signified nothing at all, since, as Davies himself has shown, with the
reconstitution of the Labour Party in 1931, Creswell and Sampson by 1934
represented no one but themselves. 9*
There is one final, and more general criticism which can be made of Kaplan's
thesis. This is its failure to take into account the struggles of classes
outside the power bloc: the struggles of both white and black workers. l0-
This paper will seek to analyse the impact of the Depression on sections of
the white working class, and the struggles which this precipitated. It will
be argued that the subsequent coalition/fusion can be seen, at least in part,
as a response at the party political level to the withdrawal of political
support by sections of the white working class from the power bloc, which
weakened the political conditions necessary for continued dominance by the
ruling classes in general. Finally, it may be argued that Fusion was eased
by the existence of the 'gold premium', after the rejection of the gold
standard, which made possible the accommodation of conflicting interests
between fractions of capital.
- 4 -
II Germiston began life in the 1880's as a mining settlement. By the 1920's
it had become the major rail junction and distribution centre of the
Southern Transvaal. During the secondary industrialization of the 1920's,
Germiston's industry was diversified in the direction of manufacture,
particularly clothing, and later engineering. The overwhelming majority
of the town's population worked in one or other of these sectors. The
electorate of Germiston was then, predominantly white working class and
new petty bourgeoisie.
The town experienced massive population growth over this period: increasing
from 42,355 in 1921 to 79,440 in 1936. An increasing proportion of the
white population (which constituted C. 50% of these figures) was made up of
dispossessed Afrikaners from the land. One Labour leader, analysing the
Labour Party's chances in the Germiston by-election remarked on the
"marked shrinkage in recent years in the number of English-speaking workers
in the urban constituencies. These English-speaking workers were the
mainstay of the Labour Party". ' in fact by 1932 Germiston was predom-
inantly Afrikaans-speaking (as far as the white population was concerned)
and contained more Afrikaans-speaking people than any other constituency
on the Rand, with the exception of Vrededorp. * Although Germiston
had been held by the Labour Party since 1924, this was only by virtue of
the Pact electoral alliance with the Nationalist Party.' Thus when Geroge
Brown, the incumbent Labour Party M.p. died in August? 1932, the Nationalists
were confident of taking the seat:
"The Nationalists firmly believe that Germiston, even under the present
delimitation, is one of their strongest seats, and the Cabinet openly laughs
at the suggestion that it cannot comfortably be won at this election for
the party".
Thus the final result when it was announced on what was a record poll for
South Africa, represented a crushing defeat for the Government:
J.G.W. Strauss (SAP) 4,257
H..J. Schlosberg (N.P.) 3,076
W.J. Dalrymple (Labour) 132
F.P. Steinhobel (National Economic Bond) 51
M. Hill (Centre Party) 33
SAP majority - 1,181
voters roll - 8,585
turnout - 7,800
F.A. Joubert, the organising secretary for the SAP in the Cape Province aptly
remarked: .
"Germiston has proved to be General Hertzog's Wakkerstroom".
General Smuts was quick to claim this result as a defeat for the Government's
policies of-maintaining the gold standard, and 'racialism' (i.e. anti-English
measures) " However, a close examination of the election campaign shows quite
clearly that these issues were not in the fore front of most people's minds.
In fact election speeches dealt overwhelmingly with the questions of wage re-
ductions and unemployment.
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The by-election result must be seen against a background of sustained attack
against sections of white workers: firstly, those whites who remained
productive workers, usually operatives, in secondary industry * ; and
secondly, productive skilled workers - the old white labour aristocracy.
Kaplan emphasises the fact that economic crisis was not so severe in South
Africa as elsewhere. There may not have been a crisis of capital in general,
but, nevertheless, unemployment was widespread * and wage cutting did take
place in certain sectors. Furthermore, economic crisis traditionally provides
an opportunity for capital to reorganise the work process in its favour, and
here there is evidence of 'speeding-up' and an intensification of the process
of des^illing. The reaction which was provoked is evidences by the figures
for industrial disputes during this period. The total number of persons on
strike for the years 1931 and 1932 was 6,284 and 4,011 respectively, whilst
the number of man-days lost for the same years was: 54,745 and 26,034.
Whites accounted for the majority of man-days lost: 42,164 in 1931 and 20,714
in 1932. These years witnessed the greatest intensity of industrial disputes
since 1922, and this was not matched again until the early years of the
second World War.
Ill These tensions and struggles, intensified by the Depression, were dramatically
manifested in a general strike of clothing workers which broke out in August
1932. The Garment Workers' Union had been fighting against low pay and
sweated labour in the industry since the late 1920*s. In 1929 the employers
on the Industrial Council, representing the larger factories, had finally
agreed to a more thorough supervision of the industry to eliminate illegal
underpayment of wages. * However, this new-found accord was shattered with
the Depression. Sachs describes the plight of 'hundreds' of government workers,
thrown out of work. ' In 1931, the GWU called a general strike of its members
when the employers demanded wage cuts of 25%, which would have brought wages
on the Rand into line with coastal rates. As a result of an inconclusive „_
strike, it was agreed to hold wages at their existing rates for 9 months.
Despite this temporary truce, attacks upon the workers continued. The employers
contravened the agreement by underpaying their employees. * The task work
system was intensified and a general enforced 'speed up' took place.
European male workers were gradually being eliminated from the industry in
favour of female labour at lower wages. ' Qualified workers on the top rate
of pay were being sacked in favour of beginners who were paid much lower rates.
Finally, after their defeat in 1931, the employers had resolved to smash the
union, in order to secure the desired wage cuts. Shop stewards and active
Union members were victimised, and attempts were made to establish a rival
'Bosses Yellow Ticket Union'.
When the agreement expired in August 1932, the employers again demanded a 25%
wage cut. They had by this time become openly hostile to the Union. A
pamphlet was issued denouncing the Union and urging the workers to accept
the terms offered. Police protection was promised to strike-breakers. The
Union's strike call was only partially successful. In Germiston, where
employers had been particularly hostile to the formation of a trade union, it
was necessary to prevent the use of scab labour by mobilizing groups of pickets,
known as 'shock brigades', and run on the lines of the'flying picket! * At
this stage, fearing the effects of a long-drawn out strike on the outcome of
the by-election, the authorities moved rapidly to break the strike. Mounted
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police were used to breach picket lines, with inevitable injuries and arrests.
These actions brought an immediate protest from white workers in Germiston.
When it was announced that two girl strikers (one of whom was a future
president of the Union - Johanna Cornelius) had been imprisoned, a crowd of
over one thousand threatened to march on the local police station unless they
were released. The GWU retaliated against the use of police by the authorities
by calling for opposition to the government's candidate in the by-election.
At one stage the Union was seriously considering^entering its organiser, G.
Malan, as a protest candidate in the election.
Meanwhile, behind the scenes. Nationalist leaders were seeking to end the
strike. After meeting with the employers, Pirow was told that Sachs presented
the only obstacle to a settlement. Subsequently Sachs was visited by two
leading Nationalist Party officials, Moll and Wentzel, and warned of the
consequences should he continue the strike.
In fact the strike was already crumbling in the face of police violence and
lack of funds and support. At this stage the Government stepped in with an
offer of arbitration. The result was a 10% cut in wages, the figure which the
employers had agreed to settle for. This defeat severly weakened the union.
Trade union activists were victimised and the Union's membership fell to a
few hundred. The final blow was delivered when Sachs, along with four
Communists, was banished from the Witwatersrand by Oswald Pirow under the
Riotous Assemblies Act (Amended 1930) for allegedly promoting racial hostility.
Pirow justified these steps in terms of a 'communist threat1. ^O. j n fact the
Communist Party was active at this time, organising the unemployed and
recruting amongst blacks. Indeed during the by-election, the Communist Party
held meetings outside the Germiston location, and organised resistance to the
 3,
lodgers tax, which in a period of high unemployment was particularly irksome.
However, in the case of Sachs, who had been expelled from the Communist Party
the previous year- Pirow1s actions were interpreted as a sop to the clothing
manufacturers. " Sachs himself drew attention to the strong links between the
Nationalist Party and the Germiston clothing employers, who had 'contributed
liberally to the funds of the Nationalist Party'. ^3. The breadth of opposition
to the banishments was particularly significant. A mass protest meeting of
2,000 people in Selbourne Hall was addressed not only by representatives of
the Communist Party and the GWU, but also by Madeley and Dalrymple of the
SALP. 3 A meeting of railwaymen at the loco sheds in Germiston, called
by the Labour Party on 16 November, also passed a resolution calling upon
the Minister of Justice to rescind the banishment orders. The Government's
use of the Riotous Assemblies Act was clearly seen as a threat to working class
organisation in general.
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III The heaviest area of retrenchment and wage-cutting during this period,
was on the railways. " This was only partly due to the Depression.
One of the effects of the Government's stand on the gold standard
was to increase the burden of interest payments, payable by the railways.
38. However, the wage reductions which were introduced were carried
out selectively. It is the way in which the cuts were administered which
reveals most clearly the state's relations with different sections of
white wage earners. It was the artisans and running staffs who bore
the brunt of the Administration's economy measures. It was alleged
that artisans lost between a quarter and a half of their earnings. ^9.
In 1931 the Administration proposed to cut artisans' bonus earnings
by 50%. 4o* After protest from the unions it was decided that there
should be instead a reduction of 5 minutes per hour on all items of
all bonus earning schedules. In fact, railway iron moulders in Pretoria,
at least, believed that this represented an even greater cut than the
50% reduction. ** Moreover, these wage cuts were seen as "a direct
lead from the Government to other employers ... what effected the Rail-
waymen today would effect other sections tomorrow". ^2.
 I n addition
to wage cuts and 'speed ups1 the railway artisans also had to suffer
extensive short-time working. **3.
The activities of the Railway Administration, vis a vis its skilled
employees, must be seen as part of capital's attempts, in conjunction
with state intervention, to undermine the position of autonomy which
white artisans had gained within the labour process. The Pact
Government, in the late 1920's, had sponsored committees and conferences
to promote mass production in the Engineering industry. 44< This in-
cluded attempts to get the craft unions to agree to amend the apprenticeship
system and to agree to tasks, formerly reserved to skilled men, being
performed by 'operatives'. In fact, as far as private engineering was
concerned, capital was only able to achieve widespread deskilling during
the Second World War. However, on the railways, the position of the
craft unions was already being undermined. The Railway Administration
was in a strong position: it was a large employer; it had close links
with government; and it was exempted from the provisions of the Indus-
trial Concilation Act, whilst conditions of service on the Railway made
it illegal to strike. 4^* The unions on the other hand were divided,
especially with the growth of the Artisan Staffs Association, which
proved more amenable to the Administrations demands to relax demarcation
lines. °* Already by the late 20's, the Administration was engaged
upon a course of mechanisation and job reorganisation wherever possible: 47.
"By the introduction of improved labour saving machinery it has been
possible to speed up output in many instances. The question of setting
reduced bonus work times for operations performed on such machines is
being closely watched".
Supervision of work was increased, 48 and bonus work inspectors were
employed to revise piece rates. 49. This was at a time when skilled
unions, such as the Iron Moulder's Society, would have nothing to do
with piece-work in private industry. 50.
The Depression and the consequent threat of unemployment allowed the
Administration to intensify its campaign. Craft union executives re-
ceived complaints that unskilled labour was being used to carry out
skilled work. *1.
 A s part of its campaign of economies, the Administration
downgraded many artisans to the level of labourer, 52 thus securing
skilled workers at labourers1 rates, and thus breaking down traditional
demarcation lines. The resulting chaos finally provoked a strike of
railway ironmoulders in Pretoria in 1934 directly over the issue of
dilution. The strike was successful in re-establishing a Line of Demar-
cation1 , 5 3 but many of the defeats suffered during the Depression
period proved permanent. 54.
The other aspect of the Administration's attitude towards its employees
was bound up with the governments policy of 'civilised labour'. In Parlia-
ment, the opposition attacked the Government with the charge that on the
railways the artisans and higher grades were financing the white labour
policy. 55. Labourers were permitted to do the work of skilled men, who
had been put on short-time. 56. Already certain grades of work - artisan
schedule *B' (which included coremaking, which in private industry,
the Iron Moulders' Society was trying to retain as part of the work of
a skilled man) - had been separated off, and alloted to white labourers
as part of a policy of providing promotion opportunities. 57. it is in-
structive to compare the evidence of different trade unions to the 1934
Railway Commission. The Mechanics Unions' Joint Executives demanded
that the white labour policy be financed out of General Revenue, and
protested against the encroachment on skilled work which had taken place.
'Die Spoorbond', which included labourers and lower grades, on the other
hand, was content to praise, the benefits of the 'civilized labour policy'.
These divisions amongst white railway workers were very evident during the
Germiston by-election. Out of some eight and a half thousand voters, it
was estimated that three thousand were railway employees or their families. 59,
It was, therefore, perhaps not surprising that railway issues should dominate
the by-election. What was striking, however, was the degree to which rail-
waymen were subjected to election speeches at their place of work. At
least thirteen such occasions are reported. All but one of the election
meetings took place outside the repair yards or the loco sheds - that is,
they were directed towards skilled workers and running staffs, rather than
labourers. Again, all but one of the meetings were held by one or other of
the opposition parties. On the one occasion when the Nationalist candidate -
Mnr Schlosberg - turned up to address a meeting of railwaymen outside the
repair shops he was given a very mixed reception. Mnr Schlosberg subse-
quently explained that: "it was not his intention to have many meetings
among the railwaymen, for he preferred to meet them personally and listen
to their grievances". °0<
In contrast the various opposition parties - SAP, SALP, New Economic Bond
and Centre Party - were all enthusiastically received. Even the Communist
Party - which was attempting to stand a black member, J.B. Marks, as a
protest dandidate - was given a hearing by the railwaymen:
"... at the railway workshops where the audience consisted mainly of
English-speaking artisans, the whites were urged to write "communist" across
their ballot papers. Most of them replied that they prefered to vote
SAP, because though they did not think very highly of the Smuts party they
wanted to show their disapproval of the Government, which had been cutting
the wages of railway workers". °lp
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The degree of alienation amongst the skilled railway workers was demonstrat
by their threat to stand their own candidate in the by-election. '
It is significant that on the one occasion that the SAP attempted to hold
an election meeting among white railway labourers, on the Germiston-Elsburg
deviation scheme, it ended in chaos and a free fight was only narrowly
averted by the sounding of the hooter, signifying that it was time to
return to work. The relationship of the white labourers to the govern-
ment is perhaps best expressed in the words of one of the hecklers at the
meeting:
"Put some money and butter in our pockets; they talk better than words."
In fact the whole background to the Elsburg deviation scheme is quite re-
vealing. The scheme had been planned for some years. It was the advent
of the by-election, however, which reminded Government ministers of the
urgency of the project. Mr Malcolm Hill of the Centre Party charged that
some 600 unemployed men were being brought to Germiston to work on the
Elsburg deviation, and would be registered as voters in order to vote for
the Nationalists. This was an exaggeration, but it does seem that suppor
for the Nationalist Party was a prerequisite for a job on the scheme.
Furthermore, it appears that many railway labourers were unaware that their
individual v^tes would remain secret, and feared that they would lose
their jobs if they voted against the Government. ' Similarly, techniques
of intimidation and employment inducements had been used by the Nationalists
during the earlier Colesburg by-election. * On that occasion the
Nationalists were victorious. However, the composition of the crucial
railway vote was very different in the two towns. On the eve of the
Germiston elections the Nationalists were still predicting victory:
"They base this confidence on the result at Colesburg, where they claim
that the railway vote was solidly theirs. They admit, however, that there
is a vast difference between the railwaymen of Colesburg and the railwaymen
of Germiston. At Colesburg a large proportion, if not the majority are
labourers. In Germiston the labourers are in a considerable minority, and
the artisans and running staff men have the issue in their hands. The
Nationalists definitely fear a landslide against them among the higher grades
of railwaymen; and in other parties this expectation applies to the whole
railway service". 6 8 #
It is, then, hardly surprising that Government spokesmen who visited Germiston
stressed the success of the Railway Administration in increasing the ratio of
white labour employed in the service, rather than the severe wage cuts
suffered by the higher grades.
IV There remains one other significant section of white wage earners in Germiston
which has not been considered so far: the miners. It has been argued that
by this time, this group formed part of a new petty bourgeoisie. '°- They no
longer performed productive work, but were solely responsible for policing
the black workers under their authority. Along with white artisans, this
group had entered into alliance with national capital in 1922-4. However,
the Pact victory of 1924 did not enable miners to regain their pre-1922
economic position. 71* "On the other hand, the white miners did, during this
period gain an important concession in the form of statutory protection
for their existing positions in the division of labour." ?2. It might be ar-
gued that the position of the white new petty bourgeoisie (miners) had
much in common with that of the white lumpenproletariat employed as
labourers by the state. Both groups saw themselves threatened by cheaper
black labour. Also, both looked to the state to guarantee their employment.
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The Depression did not seriously effect white miners, since the Mining
industry actually prospered during the Depression years. '^m It is not
surprising, therefore, that miners did not figure largely in reports of
the Germiston by-election. However, they did not remain completely silent.
C.J. Andrews, a former executive member of the S.A. Mine Workers1 Union,
condemmed the Nationalist Government's record on wages, quoting the Lucas
Award and wage cuts on the railways, as well as voicing opposition to the
Government's handling of the garment workers' strike which proved, he wrote,
that "the Nationalist Government is prepared to treat all sections of the
working class with merely a cynical contempt".
Moreover, it seemed likely at one stage-that the Gerraiston branch of the
MWU would nominate its own candidate for the by-election. In fact, this
threat seems to have been largely a protest against the particular can-
didate selected by the Nationalists, on the grounds that he was neither a
local man, nor a "worker" (i.e. was not clearly identified with the cause
of white miners) .
V I have suggested that the Depression witnessed an intensification of con-
flict between capital and certain sections of white workers. This was
reflected in the increasing use of the repressive apparatus of the state -
particularly the Riotous Assemblies Act - which was matched by a massive
withdrawal of political support by these workers from the Government.
The Germiston by-election, demonstrated the degree of alienation which
had taken place. It remains, however, to analyse why this rejection of the
Nationalist Government took the form of support for the SAP (as the
election results show that it did). It was, after all, the SAP which had
been responsible for the brutal suppression of the 1922 General Strike.
In the first place, there is some evidence, that white workers did not
vote SAP with any great enthusiasm. 7'* A vote for the SAP was a vote
against the Government. One might argue that the fact that white workers
voted SAP, at all, demonstrated the extent of their hostility to the
Nationalist Government. Certainly those who defected publicly, from the
Labour Party, during the by-election, justified their position in these
terms. 7^- The Nationalists certainly blamed their defeat in Germiston on
those Labour Party supporters who had switched their votes to the SAP. 79.
Secondly, there was no credible alternative political party to vote for.
The old SALP was compromised by its alliance with the Nationalist Party,
and its subsequent internal feuding. It was the split in 1928 which put an
end to negotiations for the trade unions to affiliate to the Labour Party,
thus depriving the Party of vital support. 80. Furthermore at the time of
the election, Forward traditionally the official organ of the SALP, was
supporting Dr BruwerTs National Economic Bond, and to a lesser extent
the Centre Party. 81* The Communist Party, on the other hand, in line with
the 'Third Period' policy of 'bolshevisation' had succeeded in isolating
itself from the registered trade union movement, and was busy trying to
establish its own 'red unions'. ' During the 1932 garment workers' strike,
the Communist Party called for opposition to.the leadership of Sachs and
Malan, and attempted to build its own 'rank and file1 movement through the
African Federation of Trade Unions. 83. Given the popularity of Sachs
amongst his membership, this position would not have endeared the C.P. to
the ordinary garment workers of Germiston. In any case, the C.P. in standing
J.B. Marks as a protest candidate, was using the by-election primarily as a
platform to further its work amongst the location dwellers of Germiston. 84.
Nor did the two new parties which stood in the by-election - the Centre Party
and the National Economic Bond - attract the votes of disillusioned white
workers. In drawing attention to the proliferation of new political parties
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during this period, Kaplan attributes this phenomenon to a "dislocation be-
tween class interest and the party political representation of this interest",
and the consequent attempt by capital to represent itself outside the trad-
itional two party system. 5* This may have been true of, some of the parties
established, but the 'Workers and Farmers' Bond, for instance, was specifically
formed to represent the interests of the white unemployed. Furthermore,
spokesmen for the two parties which contested the Germiston election
the Centre Party and the National Economic Bond - spent a great deal more
time on the plight of the railwaymen and 'poor whites', then they did talking
about the gold standard. 8 * Although Dr Bruwer was firmly opposed to the gold
standard policy and attacked the two-party system, the thrust of his speeches
and propaganda was directed towards questions of unemployment and wage cut-
ting, and was designed to appeal to white workers and unemployed.
It is for this reason that the Nationalists reserved their roughest treatment
for the Centre Party and the National Economic Bond. The Nationalists
feared that these parties - both claiming to represent the Afrikaner dis-
possessed - would draw off the votes of Afrikaner workers and unemployed.
Dr Bruwer was physically attacked, sustaining serious injury, 9 whilst the
meetings of the Centre Party were forcibly disrupted. ^0. or steenkamp was
seen by Nationalists as a traitor to Afrikanerdom, who had come to split
the vote. 91"
VI It would be wrong to conclude this analysis of the Germiston by-election
in terms of the success or failure of particular political parties. Such
an electoralist approach would be forced to conclude that the subsequent
coalition and Fusion was the result of selfless patriotism on the part of
Smuts, since the SAP stood to win outright at the next General Election.
Similarly, as I have already argued, it is not adequate to conceptualise
Fusion as the outcome of a disjuncture between the interests of capital
and the form of party political representation. 9^. Rather, it is
possible to regard 'Fusion' as a response to a minor 'crisis of Authority' 93:
a crisis at the level of party political representation precipitated by
the withdrawal of electoral/political support by sectors of the white
working class. The immediate background to this crisis was the Depression,
and the intensification of conflict between these white workers and capital.
The increasing intervention of the state to secure the interests of capital
led to a general withdrawal of political support from the Government by
these sectors of white workers. The SAP, on the other hand, although it
might expect to win a general election was also discredited, in the eyes of
white workers, by its record in the early 1920's. South Africa's system
of electoral representation had narrowed to the point where its function
as a means of 'integrating the state into the society1 had been severly
weakened. 94.
In the short-term capital sought to restructure the relations of exploitation
at the expense of white and black workers alike. 95' H6wever, in the long-term,
given the rapid growth of-a black urban proletariat, which was already develop-
- ing trade Union and other forms of opposition to its conditions of exploitation,
it was essential for capital to re-establish the maximum political support which
was necessary for its continued. dominance. - The Communist Party was certainly very
influential amongst black workers and town dwellers at this time. - 96-
Moerover, the Party's work amongst the unemployed produced incidents of
non-racial class unity. Thus on May Day 1931, 2,000 Africans and 1,000
whites marched through Johannesburg to protest against unemployment. 97.
Teilman Roos may have been exaggerating the position, but it is significant
that when he called for a national government on 22 December 1932, it was
for the purpose of 'abandoning the gold standard and saving the country
from communism*. 9°*
Coalition and Fusion represented a reorganisation of the process of party
political representation for the purpose of seeking to regain che electoral/
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political support of white workers, thus preventing any possible alliance
with the emerging black proletariat, and guaranteeing the political conditions
necessary for the continued rule of capital.
At a more concrete level, there is evidence to support such a thesis. Smuts
himself stressed the need to allow white labour electoral representation,
under certain conditions. In return for support for the coalition, the
South African Party was willing to provide three safe seats to labour men:
"We are making them a present of these seats, and we did it as a message
of good will to the workers of this country. And the workers may rest
assured that, not only are we doing our best to keep their representation
in parliament - if we did not do so they would probably not have representation
at all - but they may be assured that we shall continue to watch over their
welfare, and we shall look after the interests of the workers of this
country to the very best of our ability". "*
In class society, I would suggest, a primary function of parliamentary
institutions is to afford apparent representation to the dominated classes
(in the South African situation, of course, only certain racially defined
sections of the dominated classes are in question) . This is one of the
ways in which the state is integrated into society. Kaplan's work, on the
other hand, seems to suggest that Parliamentary institutions can be seen as
an arena in which various fractions of capital {acting through party political
representation) battle for dominance (if not hegemony).
This paper has dealt with the urban dimension of the Depression. It should
be remembered, however, that the crisis was also a rural phenomenon.
Agricultural prices fell, a process which was exaccerbated by Hertzog's
decision to stay on the gold standard. Smuts commented on the consequent
disaffection in the countryside:
"Half the country is bankrupt; Bolshevism is invading the platteland where
all the talk is of moratorium, repudiation and like dangerous stuff". 100-
It was exactly such issues as rural debt which provided ammunition for the
new populist parties which emerged during this period. The political and
ideological ramifications of the Depression are demonstrated in Smuts' private
correspondence, where repeatedly he feels obliged to justify the capitalist
system against the challenge offered by a communist alternative. lo1- Thus
he wrote:
"There has never been such a test applied to our economic civilization, and
it is still a question whether we can pull through without serious challenge
to our spritual heritage." 102.
This paper has tried to suggest that Fusion was a response to social and
political crisis brought about by an intensification of conflict between
capital and labour. However, it would not be possible to 'explain' Fusion at
this level alone. Such a course would deny any autonomy to the 'political1.
In the first place, the existence of a tradition of 'hereniging,1 dating from
at least the mid-1920's, meant that Fusion was a concrete option during the
crisis of the early 30's. l 0 One must also take account of the role of
Roos in precipitating coalition. (In passing, it was the result of the
Germiston by-election which prompted Roos to call for a national government
in the first place l o 4 * ) . Roos's activities certainly frightened the
traditional party leaders, and made them more amenable to coalition. Even
Smuts hinted on one occassion that the emergence of a third party led by
Roos might affect the SAP'S chances of victory in an election. Roos,
however, was only a catalyst. For a short time he was borne along by a
wave of popular discontent. Smuts himself emphasised the role of mass
pressure in bringing about coalition. lo6* It is, then, in this popular
disaffection, that the roots of Fusion must be sought, rather than in the
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